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lV!ERKOURIS C.2d 
Criminal Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-
the whether a "doubt" has arisen 
is for determination of the trial judge 
as a matter of a doubt may be said 
of discretion by 
be disturbed 
[2a, !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Discre-
tion.-Where a doubt of defendant's sanity at the time of trial 
appears on the face of the record as a matter of law, as where 
the after reading an affidavit of a qualified psychiatrist 
in it was averred that defendant was medically and 
legally insane, and after being told that defendant did not 
want a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity entered, said 
that it would be "compelled" to accept such a plea, an abuse 
of discretion in permitting defendant to withdraw the plea is 
shown, the failure to order a determination of the question of 
sanity results in a miscarriage of justice, and a reversal is 
required. 
[3] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Necessity For. 
-Where three court-appointed psychiatrists considered de-
fendant sane at the time of trial and at the time the crime 
in question was committed, and one independent psychiatrist 
considered him both legally and medically insane at both times, 
such conflict in medical evidence was sufficient to make the 
question one of fact which should have been tried. 
[4] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt.-It is 
the court's duty to order an inquisition on its own motion if 
at any time a doubt arises as to a defendant's present sanity, 
and no plea of present insanity is required for a trial of such 
issue. 
[5] Attorneys-Authority-Control of Litigation.-An attorney of 
record has the exclusive right to appear in court for his client 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 156; Am.Jur., Attor-
neys at Law, § 85 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Criminal Law, § 236(2); [2] 
Criminal Law, § 236(5); [3] Criminal Law, § 236; [5] Attorneys, 
§55; [6] Homicide,§ 262; [7] Criminal Law, § 32.5; [8, 9] Homi-
§ 67; [10] Criminal Law, § 531; [11] Homicide, § 119; [12] 
Criminal Law,§ 1080(5); [13] Criminal Law,§ 516; [14] Homicide, 
§ 267; [15] Homicide, § 235; [16] Criminal Law, § 582 (1). 
was properly instructed 
for which such evidence wns received. 
Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge.-Tt is llw the 
in the admini::;tration of to preserve the order 
of the court and to see that all pPrsons, defendant 
indulge in no act or conduet ealcnlntrd to obstruct 
the administration of justice; and it was not prejudicial mis-
conduct to inl'orm defendant, who had :weused the 
of running the trial in a yery that 
he made anotlwr outburst lw would 
[81 Homicide-Evidence-Threats.---While threats made de-
fendant against the dect'ased are admissible in r·\-[upneP in n 
murder prosecntion to show threats another 
]l('l'c'(ll1 are only :1tlmitted under circumstnnePs which show 
some connection with thP in.iur:· inflidet1 011 tlH· and 
where a sufficient cmml'dion is shown sueh threats arc ad-
missible. 
Id.-Evidence-Threats.---WherP the evidenee shmn·d that 
defendant's former wife and her new husband lwr1 hf'Pll killed 
the same manner aud presumably :1t the samP time, r1efend-
1etter to his fon;H·r wi !'<o which accused her of a 
sexual degenerate could be considered a malicious ldter nnd 
he wrote to her 1ww hushnnd, tPlling him not to woJT~· 
nbout his wife's allrged sexunl drgencracy hPc:Juse he would 
11ot lw around long, could hr (:Oilsidere<1 a thrnnt lwenuse of 
to defendant's former wife. 
Criminal Law-Evidence--Best and Secondary Evidence.-~ 
eourt in a murder prosecution did not err in 
evidence> of tht' contents of h~ttPrs which tle CelH1:mt 
lind St'nt his of the destruction tlwreof 
first madn who lrrter testified :JS 
contents of the lcttPrs. 
Homicide-Evidence-Letters.---Remotenf;s:-; in 
malicious and threatening letters which in n 
had 
of rather than its 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-Defendant 
cannot that a copy of the record-
officer with him was played 
and the 
the copy, was 
of a 
admitted in evidence 
thnt 
Evidence.-Defendant cnnnot 
notrs and a written tran-
nn offieer IYPre erroneousl,v 
where the Tecord shows 
to Code Civ. Proc., § 2047, 
memoTy from that the 
were marked for identificmtion, and that 
the court informed all attorneys they might sc>e and use them, 
to which defense counsel replied, "Thank you very mueh.'' 
i14] Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In a 
murder prosecution, it was prejudicial error to give an instruc-
tion on lying in wait where, though there was evidence that 
defendant was the man who had been sitting in an automobile 
near decedent's shop for some time prior to the dnte of the 
crime, there was no evidence tending to show that defendant 
made any attempt to conceal himself or to keep his presence 
in the vicinity of the shop a secret, and where the last time 
his car was shown to have been parked in the vicinity was 
two days before the crime. 
[15] !d.-Instructions-Duties of Jurors.-In a murder prosecu-
tion, the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested in-
struction concerning the jury's duty if the evidence was 
susceptible of two reasonable theories, one pointing to his 
guilt and the other to his innocence, where the evidence was 
f'ntirely circumstantial, no murder weapon was ever found, 
no fingrrprints matching those of drfPndant were found in the 
shop where tlw crime was committed, nnd the most incriminat-
ing evidenee deff'ndnnt, which the jUt')' could have 
clisheliew:d, was that he was i(kntified ns the man coming out 
of the hack of the shop. 
[16] Criminal Law- Evidence- Degree of Proof- Reasonable 
Doubt.-In a criminal case the prosecution must prove de-
fendnnt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the evidence 
is equally balanced, defendant is entitled to an acquittal. 
APPEATj (antomati(·ally talwn und<~r Pen. Cocl(•, § 1239, 
snbd. ) from a jndg·ment of the Superior Cunrt of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a llCW trial. 
Charles Vv. Friekc, J udgc. Be versed. 




He Hot gui , aiHl not 
'l'he jnry returned a Yerdiet of first 
bast~(] upon eireum-
Defendant 's motiou for a JlC\r trial was 
and judgnwnt was thereafter and the 
imposetl. 'I'he HJlpcal is antomatie. (Pen. Code, 
snbd. (b).) 
J)pfemlant and Despiue were married in Midi ig·an in 1944. 
nwve!l to r,os .Angeles wlH•re they St'parated ill February, 
Dt•fetH_hwt rliYorc~ed Dt~svine in l\Iit·lligaa in l\Iay, ] })4;). 
was marriet1 to Hobert Forbes in , 194f), 
Angeles. Robert, a formrr police oflieer, and Des pine 
\l't·ni. into the eemmies bm:iness at G~J:](j \Vest Boulevard in 
the summet· of lD-l-8. lnspeetor \Yood of the United 
Sta1 Post Offiee ret'eiwt1 a telephone ('all fro!\l a lll<lll 
id,·ntifie(] himsel1' as Hobert Forbes. 'Wood 
that the person iclentifying him;-;elf as Hobert Po1·bes 
JlWdl: eomplaint iuyo]ving a Yiolation of postal regulations 
n·st~lt of whieh he went to the eeramies shop and inter-
Hobet·t Forbes. B'orbes diredecl Inspector ·wood to 
the home of Despine's mother where he pieked up three 
in l'u vtlopes. TlH' envelope;,: were postmarLed at Los 
and two of them were ad<1ressed to l\Ir. Forbes awl 
l\I rs. J;'orbes; the letters -vvere signed ",Jim JYierkonris" 
. " The letters acensec1 J\Trs. Porbes of being 
degenerate and toltl Mr. F'orbes 1wt to worry abont 
'J>dendant was charged in another information with 
Hull\crt F'orbes, husband of Despiue. 'l'he distrid 
to only on the information charging the murder of 
after the ven1id wns rdnmed, reqnest.ed permission to 
witlt,[rnw this plen. 
of these points :He now r·on1t sltonld 
revase tlt<' judgm(·llt nnd will l>e 






officer testified that Porbes had told him he was 
a to carry a gun because Despine 's 
"ex-husband" had been telephoning them and writing letters 
and that he was afraid of the man. 
defendant and one Jerry Pappos ran a restaurant 
Michigan, for about three weeks. During that 
Mr. Pappos went to the restaurant one morning and 
found a box with two guns in the bottom of the cigarette 
case. One of the guns had a cylinder on it similar to that 
on a Colt .38, but they were bigger. When he asked de-
fendant about the guns, defendant said they belonged to a 
friend of his. Mr. Pappos told the defendant to get rid of 
them and defendant said, "Soon I get the guy I get them 
out." The guns disappeared shortly thereafter. When the 
business was broken up, Mr. Pappos bought defendant's in-
terest by buying defendant a car in his, Pappos', name, and 
making the payments thereon. The car was a black 1953 
Pontiac hard-top. 
The record shows that defendant, using the name "Jerry 
Pappas,'' registered at a hotel in Los Angeles on September 3, 
1954; that he was driving a black 1953 Pontiac with Michigan 
license plates. Defendant checked out of the hotel on Sep-
tember 8, 1954. 
Customarily, Robert Porbes took Despine to the ceramics 
and then took their daughter to the home of Despine's c 
mother where she vvas cared for during the day. Almost t 
eYery day, Robert would park his car on West Pifty-ninth f 
Place, go down the alley and into the back of the ceramics l3 
shop. On the morning of September 20th, a witness testified 
that he saw Robert open a window of the ceramics shop at s. 
about 9 :10 or 9 :15; at from 9 :15 to 9 :20 on the same morning, n 
Robert took the daughter to Despine's mother's home where I 
he was given a bowl of mush to take to Despine. Sometime '' 
between 9 and 10, the morning of the 20th, Robert was seen d 
to park his car on Pifty-ninth Place and go toward the back a 
of it as if to go down the alley. h 
Mr. and Mrs. Miner operated a service station at 5924 tl 
same car 
the >vhcel. 
'' on the license plate. On each of the 
7th through the 18th, with the 
, the 12th, the Miners saw the same car, with 
to be the same man, parked either by the 







headed east toward \Vest Boulevard. rrhe man's head, 
when he was parked on Vvest Boulevard, appeared to the 
Miners to be facing south on \Vest Boulevard and at times 
he to be looking at the service station. vVhen the 
was parked on Fifty-ninth Place west of \Vest Boulevard, 
he to J\frs. Miner to be looking in the direction of 
the service station or straight ahead. On September 14, 1951, 
Mr. Miner became suspicious and called the car to the atten-
tion of a sergeant of the Police Department. The sergeant, 
was in sport clothes, off dnty, and a customer of the 
drove around behind the suspect car aiH1 aseertained 
that the license plate read AA 6:1:10 1\Iiehigan. He ·wrote the 
number on the back of an envelope and gaYe it to the Miners. 
The sergeant could not positiYcly identify the tlefcndant as 
the man he had seen in the car. At one time, Mrs. lVIiner saw 
the man out of the car ·walking north to·ward a flower shop 
on corner of Fifty-ninth Place. Mrs. 1\Iiner identified 
the (1efeudant as the man in the car. The Miners were both 
familiar with the ceramics shop owned by the Forbeses and 
knew both Despine and Hobert. 
About 9:15 a. m., September 20, 1954, Mr. 1\Iiner saw the 
same Pontiac, with the same man in it, going west on Fifty-
ninth Place. After making the boulevard stop on \Vest 
Boulevard, the car turned south and passed from his sight; 
within five minutes thereafter he saw the man who had bern 
the Pontiac walking- around the apartment house 
and then east on Fifty-ninth Place toward the alley. The man 
turned his head and he and 1\fr. Miner stared at each other; 




The man ident ifie(l Mr. ii!Jiller as the 
About !J :1 a. Ill., ember 1\lrs. Simons was 
UlJ elot lws in an arc·away lwh\.('nn the ceramics shop 
and an housl' wh('Jl she saw a man enter 
the areaway from .,West Boulevard awl go into the first entry-
in the buildi llg; she saw him lean out 
and look toward her; when she started toward 
him he ran out of the west entrance the way he had come. 
Mrs. Simons identified defendant from a pic:tmc of him and 
said that she recognized the lower part of his face sinl;C the 
man she had seen in the areaway had hi.s hat pulled down 
over his eyes. Sometime during the morning, she heard four 
thumping, thudding sounds coming from within the ceramics 
shop ; the sounds were different from those she had previously 
heard coming from the shop. 
Around 9 :45 a. m., September 20, 1954, Paul Y onadi left 
his apartment at 3550 \Vest Fifty-ninth Place and backed 
his car ont of the garage whic:h was across the areaway from 
the rear of the ceramics shop into the alley. He got out of 
the car to close the garage door. At this time, he saw a man, 
whom he identified as the defendant, come out of the wooden 
gate at the rear of the ceramics shop. Mr. Yonadi and the 
man looked at each other; the man tllen walked southward 
down the alley without turning around. 
At 11:25 a.m., September 20, 1954, a sheriff's patrol officer 
noted in his daily log that he had seen a 1932 Pontiac coach 
with a Michigan license plate AA-69-30 standing without 
a driver, or occupant, abont 250 yards from the beach area 
at Point Dume, which is about 12 miles from Santa Monica. 
The officer searched the car but found no registration or 
identification. He looked for someone having a possible con-
nection with the car but found no one. The driving time 
between the ceramics shop and Point Dnme was approxi-
mately 49 minutes. 
Between 11:15 and 11:30 a. m., September 20, 1954, a 
salesman who made regular calls at the ceramics shop with 
bread, found the front door of the shop open. He rang 
several times but no one answered. He opened the door 
leading from the display room to the room in back thereof 
and saw the body of Mr. Forbes lying on the floor. The police 
were called, and when they arrived to investigate they found 
tllP body of Mrs. I<'orbes in a room adjoining that in which 
Mr. Forbes' body was found. Both Mr. and Mrs. Forbes 
PEOPLE v. MERKOURIS 




Forbes of the Los Angeles was 
oru,tntlr ·of the Forbes. 
:former husband been from and ob-
DIClt1Xres of him from Despine 's mother. These 
shown to the and to Mrs. Simons 
who all as the man 
seen that 
latent fingerprint were 
the ceramics shop, 19 of identifiable; nor1e 
them corresponded to defendant's prints. A ''Cat's-Paw" 
print was by the rear gate to the 
. The evidence that the heel of shoe 
have made the 
The evidence is or types, of 
used. Of ·the recovered from the 
shop, five be slugs or spent bullets; 
appeared to po:ttions of bullets, one of and 
other two of a brass or copper material. The ballistics 
was of the opinion that tire eight slugs and 
in the shop · well as the one recovered from 
body of Despine had been fired from a .45 caliber 
and Wesson gun. :The expert witness was also of 
opinion that the bullet recovered from the body of Robert 
a .32 caliber bullet. The area around Point Dume 
the Pontiac car had been found parked on the morning· 
September .20th was carefully searched and 
rocks but failed to 
man 
JY!ERKOURIS C.2d 
The defendant asked to be 
; in it he found a a 
's Handbook" with certain under-
The car was impounded 
Pueblo; no was ever made of the accident. The 
record shows that it was possible for defendant to have been 
Point Dume at the time noted and close to Pueblo on 
22d. 
Defendant >vas arrested in Hot Springs, Arkansas, on 
1954. The officer sent to extradite him said 
defendant said he had not been in r~os Angeles for some 
seven or eight years. Defendant testified that he had arrived 
in J_;os on September 3, 1954; that he left after :five 
or s1x to go to Texas; that he arrived in Galveston, 
or so before September 19th; that he saw his 
father in Galveston; that on the 19th of September, he left 
Galveston for Houston, which he left on the 20th; that he 
arrived in Dallas on the 20th; that he left Dallas on the 
20th after eating and getting gas for the Pontiac; that he 
went to Oklahoma leaving there on the 21st for Amarillo, 
Texas, on his way to Colorado; that he left Amarillo between 
midnight and 3 in the morning on the 22d, headed for Colo-
rado on the way to Salt Lake City; tl1at l1e passed through 
Pueblo and headed west; that he had a flat tire about 10 miles 
outside Pueblo; that on the way back to Pueblo, he lost control 
of the ear which overturned; that a farmer drove him into 
Pueblo where by telephone he notified the police of the acci-
dent. He testified that from the bus depot in Pueblo, he 
took a bus to Oklahoma City where he bougllt a ticket to 
Hot Rprings, Arkansas, where he was arrested. Defendant 
denied telling the officer he had not been in lJOS Angeles for 
seven or years ; and said that the guns* had been 
tempornrily left by a customer and appeared to be .22 caliber 
DEFENDANT SANITY AT Tnm OF TRIAI .. 
Defendant contends that the court erred in proceeding to 
! r·ial on the first of trial, February 7, 1955, there 
·•·Heretofore mentionerl in ).fr. Pappos' teRtimony. 
·while he is insane." 
Section 1368 of the Penal Code 
the pendency of an action and to a 
arises as to the sanity of the the court must 
the question as to his sanity to be determined a trial 
the court without a jury, or with a if a trial 
is demanded. . . . '' 
People argue that Dr. Miller's affidavit was handed 
court "regarding the plea of not guilty by reason of 
'; that such a plea ·was thereupon entered and three 
appointed by the court to examine the defendant; 
at no time did defendant's counsel suggest tl1at defendant 
insane at the time of trial so as to bring into play the 
of sections 1367 a ntl 1368 of the Penal Code. It is 
by the People that defendant's counsel did not inti-
by affidavit or otherwise, that defendant was un-
cooperative or that they vYere unable to obtain assistance 
or information from him in preparing his defense. Dr. Mil-
ler's affidavit shows, however, that "he [defendant] felt his 
attorneys 'were railroading me in' and 'trying to get my 
' "; that "He [defendant J has been uncoopera-
with his attornrys and demanding; refusing to take 
feeling that they should believe he is innocent, they 
should get angry at the people he is angry and that he 
is supreme in hi.s knowledge." 
reports of the three court-appointed doctors were re-
ceived by the court approximately a week after the commence-
of the trial. Two of these reports show that the doctors 
of the opinion that defendant was sane at the time of 
trial as well as at the time the crime was committed; the 
third report was to the same effect, although stating that 




Cal. 428 108 P. v. 
467 [150 P. ; People v. West, 25 
) And it is where, as a matter of law, a 'doubt' may 
btc said o appear, or where there has been an abuse of tlw dis-
eretion that is vested in the trial judge, in the determination 
of the that the conclusion of the latter properly 
may be disturbed on appeal therefrom. (People v. GilbeTg, 
197 Cal. 306, 317 [240 P. 1000]; People v. MoTiaTity, 61 Cal. 
App. 223 [214 P. 485] ; People v. Rosner, 78 Cal.App. 497 
[248 P. 683]; People v. J(iTby, 15 Cal.App. 264 [114 P. 794]; 
People v. Little, 68 Cal.App. 674 [230 P. 178]; People v. 
Hettick, 126 Cal. 425 [58 P. 918].)" (People v. ApaTicio, 
:18 Cal.2d 565 [241 P .2d 221].) It was also said in the Perry 
case, supra, that if the person whose sanity is in question is 
capable of understanding the nature and object of the pro. 
t·eedings against him and can conduct his defense in a rational 
manner, he should be deemed sane for the purpose of being 
tried, though on some other subject his mind may be deranged 
or unsound. 
rrhe report of one of the court-appointed doctors shows 
that defendant resent(•d the examinations; that he stated that 
l1e resented the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity; 
that he at all times e1aimed he was innocent of the crime 
with which he was charged; that he refused to ansvYer numer-
ous seemingly unrelated questions on the ground that his 
refusal was on ''advice of counsel.'' 
Closely related to this problem is that which occurred after 
the jury had returned a verdict of first degree murder with· 
o11t recommendation : 
'' rrnE CoURT : . . . I understand there is a matter to be 
taken up out of the presence of the jury. IJet the reeord 
show the district attorney, defense counsel and the defendant 
are present. Is there anything yon gentlemen want to take 
np before we proceed? 
"MR. SoLOMON: I was going to make this statement, if 
the Court please, that the defense is prepared to go ahead with 
thiR plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. I understand, 
though, Mr. Merkouris feels differently about it. 
''THE DEFENDANT : Yes, that is right. 
PEOPLE v. MERKOURIS 
[46 C.2d 540; 297 P.2d 9991 
1 CoURT: Let me 





would il that plea >Yonld llave to be entered 
brforc tl1e Court c:;tartrd its triaL T will say if I had becll 
1 would haYe done' cxadly ihc saJJJC thing, and 
law a few years myself. He's been 
ng law a gl'eat many years. \\"e had also the advan~ 
of your other iwo aii orncys. 
" have 11011· got to the point where the next step in 
the rial wou1rl be the trial of that question of 11ot gnilty 
reason of immnity. Now, yon han· indieatcd tlmt yon don't 
1nlllt that trial. 
• Trm DlWK\'DAWr: T don't want what 
CoUR1': You don't wa11t to])(' tried on tl1is qnr~tioJl 
of 
"Trm DEFENDAJ\i'l': Yes, ilHtl is cmTeet. 
"'I'm.; CourtT: Do yon want to withdraw your plea of Hot 
"'J'nE DEFENDA~T: Tlw plea was entered over my objec-
tion. 
"'l'rn; Comvr: I nwlcrstand. 
'"l'rm DEFENDANT: A~; I explained to those men, it carric~d 
an implication of guilty, and that \Yas one of the main reasons 
those people convicted me. \Vell, that's beside the point 
How. T nnderstancl that; in any enmt I \Yant the plea <ritlt-
flrawn right nmv. because as far as I Ntn sec it's nsele;.;s. 
"'l'rm CoUR'r: I \Yant ron to thoroughl.v 111J(len:;1atH1 tlH· 
ef'i'l'<·t of this sit nation. [ 'm not going to talk a bout your 
1·<1~1\ 1 'm going to tall;: about cases iu which both pleas are 
clllPred. If a defendant is trie(l for all offense and found 
, and also has the plea of not gnilty b~- reason of in-
we llext tr.\· in n•g11br order the qnestion as to that 
ol' inS!illi1.\', i;.: 1lH· Ill!ltl leg·ally iiiN!ItH' or is hr leg·ally 
Ill< lh:F~<:':Ill:\'1'- I ltltdt•rstund tlwt. 
liE ( !onwr: II' tit1' .it:r)· fouttd hitn Jly c-::llli', then 
o11lPr wnli('(. of guill.\' stands: if' ftc· is legally im;aJJ(' 
operates as an acqniital. Now, that is an opportunity 
reason of ut~;a,11u.v 
that still carries an 
and I see no reason I should give 
I did not commit these 
to go into the 
convict me of crimes I did 
I understand that. 
I understand what you mean. 
advised you to stand on your 
"THE DEPENDANT: You're at it from a lawyer's 
but the jury is not. 
"THE CouRT : of course, we can't view it also from 
the defendant's viewpoint, he's sitting in a different seat 
at it. 
'' 'I'HE DEI<'ENDANT: I want it withdrawn. 
''THE CouRT : You definitely do not want to try this ques-
tion of 
''THE DEFENDANT: No. 
''THE CouRT : You want to withdraw the plea You un-
derstand if you do withdra\\· it, you stand convicted of first 
degree murder with the death penalty~ 
'' 'fnE DEFEXDANT : I understand. 
''THE CouRT : 'fhe only possibility you've g·ot is the chance 
will be accomplished? 
"TuE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand. 
''THE CouRT: I-1et the record show the plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity has been withdrawn." 
It is contended by the defense that the trial court com-
mitted prejudicial error in permitting defendant himself to 
withdraw the plea of not guilty b~' reason of insanity when 
he was represented by counsel and when the defendant's 
sanity was the very issue involved. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial itself, the court 
had before it an affidavit of a qualified psychiatrist in which 
it was averred, without any equiYoeation, that the defendant 
was medically and legally insane at the time of trial, as well 
as at the time the alleged act was committed. The Penal 
Code ( § 1368) that "If at any time during the 
of an action . . a doubt arises as to the sanity 
of the defendant, the court must order the question as to his 
sanity to be determined by a trial by the court without a 
jury, or with a jury, if a trial by jury is demanded. . . . " 
the 
to examine the defendant It appears 
that there was, at that a doubt m 
iw1 of the court as to tld'endaut 
·12 CaL 21.) We ~aid in 
'aL2d 568 [241 P.2d 221], that "wlwn a doubt of 
defendant's . appears on the face of the record 
matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown and the 
to order a detrrmination of the of sanity 
in a misearriage of ;justice and a reversal is required. 
v. Vester, 13.) Cal.App. 223 [26 P.2d ; People v. 
snpra, 25 Cal.App. 869 [143 P. 793].)" 
Taking the evidence concerning defendant's sanity 
u:: r:•fleetrd in the record, we see that three court-appointed 
consickred him sane at the time of trial as well 
at the time the crime was eommitted; we see that one 
psychiatrist (~onsidered him both legally and 
im;ane at both times. This conflict in the mel1ical 
was sufficient to make the question one of fact ·which 
have been tried. 'l'he colloquy bl'tween the eourt and 
the defendant relative to a withdrawal of the plea of not 
by reason of in:':anity shows that the defemlant did 
1mderstand the graYity of his predicament. (People v. 
43 Cal.2d fi72. fi7G [275 P.2c1 2fi]; Prop7c v. Gomez, 
(a1.2d 150, 158 [258 P.2d 825] ; People v. Ap(fririo, 38 
565, 576 [241 P.2d 221].) He did not mmt, so he 
, for the j nry to haw before it the "implication of guilt." 
l t "honld be remembered that this d0sire of clcfE'rH1ant 's was 
the jury had fomHl him g;nilty of 11mnler in 
degree ·without recommendation. 
It is our eonclnsion that the trial conrt abused its 
in not trying the issue of defendant's sanity at 
eommencement of the trial and in permitting tlw defend-
aHL over the implied objection of hiR counsel, to withdraw 
hi,; of not gnilty by reason of insanity. The People's 
1ment that defense counsel did not offer Dr. ;\!filler's affi-
a doubt 
, ilw ':ourt "nmsL order 
It is the ol' the eourt 
if at any time 
We said 
P.2d 221], that 
of the defendant ... to that he was 
within the of the section is not con-
upon the trial the 
statute is not conditioned on a motion in reliance on the 
code provision." (People v. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18, 21; People 
135 Cal.App. 223, 237 P.2d 685] ; People v. 
198 Cal. 601, 606 [246 P. 802].) In People v. Vestm·, 
1:35 Ca1.App. 223, 228 [26 P.2d 685], it was said: "If, then, 
as a matter of law it appear that the facts were such that 
a 'doubt' must or should have arisen (and not 
simply that as a privilege, or as a favor, such a conclusion 
mig·ht, or might not, have been accorded to defendant, de-
pendent upon the discretion of the trial judge), it becomes 
clear that in the failure by the trial judge to decide that a 
'doubt' had arisen as to the sanity of defendant, and there-
upon to order that 'the question as to his sanity ... be sub-
mitted to a jury,' an omission by the trial court to exercise 
what may be termed a jurisdictional duty resulted, with tlle 
inevitable consequence that defendant was prejndicrd in his 
substantial right in the premises.'' 
[5] Defendant was represented by counsel and "It is 
settled that the attorney of record has the exclusive right to 
appear in court for his client and to control the court pro-
eeedings, so that neither the party himself (Anglo Cali-
fornia Trust Co. v. Kelly, 95 Cal.App. 390 [272 P. 1080] ; 
Boca etc. R. R. Co. v. S~Lperior Court, 150 Cal. 153 [88 P. 
7151 ; Electric Utilities Co. v. Smallpage, 137 Cal.App. 642, 
t343 [31 P.2d 412]; Toy v. Haskell, 128 Cal. 558 [61 P. 89, 79 
Am.St.Rep. 70] CTescent Canal Co. v. Montgomery, 124 
Cal. 134 [56 P. 797]; Wylie v. Sierra Gold Co., 120 Cal. 485 
[52 P. 8091 ; JJiott v. Foster, 45 Cal. 72; Board of Commis-
sioners v. Younger, 29 Cal. 147 [87 Am.Dcc. 164]), nor an-
other attorney (,Johnston v. City of San Fernando, 35 CaL 
App.2d 244, 247 [95 P.2d 147]; Drnmmon'd v. West, 212 
Cal. 766, 769 [300 P. 823] ; McMahon v. Thomas, 114 Cal. 588 
[ 46 P. 732] ; Prescott v. SaUhouse, 53 Cal. 221; Hobbs v. Duff, 
INFOIDL\'l'TON 
[ 1:12 l'.2d 
ll-ins! f'/'. 
tlt0 fuf:i 
colltrnds that the tria 1 court f'Ollllni it f'd 
misconduct iu prrmitti the admission of e\·i-
relative to the deatl1 of Hobert Porhes when the distrit:i 
had elected to solely on tlw informatimt 
him with the murder of Dnspi1w Porlws. It is 
r-olltcnded that the admission of this cvide1wc \Yas so prej-
as to deprive him of due process of hnv \Yithin the 
of both the federal and California Constitutions. 
nppears that here the evidence com of showell 
nwr~' than merely criminal clisposition :mel was proprr1y <H1-
part of the res or bec-nnse it helped to clis-
intent, or a eomnlOJJ plan or sdwnw. 'l'lw vif'iim:-: 
deaths in the same 1mumer from a11 that ap-
at approximately the same time. The jnry was properl.1· 
instruetccl eoneerning- the limite(1 Jllli']Hlse for whieh sueh 
at 
was reecived . 
. \LLEOED Prn:.n·nr('I.\L J\Irsnl>:DUCT oF Tnl.\L CnPRT 
It is eontended that tile trial euw·t wa~ g·uilty of 
wli1·ial llliseondnd in informi11g· defPIHlant 1 h;d il' lw 
another ouih1n·st. he ·wou1(1 )H• 
1 he :ntlops,\· surgeou had tcslifi.Pd tOJH't'rlling· I! 
of the body of Hobert Forlws. t)J<• following IJt'-
, li0\1·, ,\IJII go 11heud illl<l illllslrai wllili ~·on 
lt~st ilied a bon I t•oJH·vr·n Ilia! !irsi wound. 
Couwr: iTo dt•f,;u;.;•.: vollllseli \:oi qtriiP loud. 
lvwt:JJ, 1 ean hear \\·hat ,\·on sa~· up het·1•. 




''THE DEFENDANT : I'm 
in my 
''THE CouRT : I don't care 
''THE DEFENDANT : You are 
about your 
conducting this trial in a 
manner, in a You are 
here for one count. You are 
who were killed. 
''THE CoURT: I'm 
of two 
this 
'' 'rHE DEFENDANT : You are running this trial in a very 
prejudicial manner. 
"THE CouRT: You may proceed, Mr. Leavy. 
''THE DEFENDANT: You stupid old fool! 
"THE \VITNESS: Wound Number 1--
"MR. LEAVY: Doctor, I don't mean to interrupt you when 
you point out this--
'' THE DEFENDANT: You may have written a few books on 
]aw, but you haven't learned anything. You not only have a 
bungling police department--
'' THE CouRT: That's enough. I want to inform counsel--
''THE DEFENDANT: --but an unscrupulous prosecutor. 
''THE CouRT: According to People versus Harris, I have a 
right to order this man to be gagged so that he can't make any 
noise, and I shall do so if >Ye have any further disturbance 
along this line.'' 
In People v. Harris, 45 Cal.App. 547, 552-553 [188 P. 65], 
a similar occurrence took place and the court threatened in the 
presence of the jury to gag the defendant. It was there 
said: "It was the right of the defendant to be present at his 
trial and this right, notwithstanding his obstreperous con-
duct, was accorded him. It is the duty of a judge in the ad-
ministration of justice to preserve the order of the court 
and to see to it that all persons whomsoever, including the de-
fendant himself, indulge in no act or conduct calculated to 
obstruct the administration of justice." In People v. Loomis, 
27 Cal.App.2d 236, 239 [80 P.2d 1012], the defendant, be-
cause of his loud and tumultuous conduct during the trial, 
was strapped to a chair and gagged. It was there held that 
''There can be no doubt as to the right o£ the court to use 
reasonable restraint in order to conduct the trial in an orderly 
and dignified manner." In view of the defendant's conduct, 




court erred in <tutlut,tutg; 
written defendant to two 
rec,cuu;u that letters themselves had 
and that he was peJrmi[tteid 
nn,~nh~~';~~ his recollection of their contents. It 
also be recalled the letter to Robert 
worry about his wife's <Ui'"l>'."'u 
he would not be around long. 
ren.ua1:u that the if any, was <tj4<uu;st 
Ue!mnle with whose murder he is In this connec-
it is also that the evidence concerning the letters 
remote as to be immaterial and [8] In an-
to the first argument, in People v. WiU, 173 Cal. 477, 
[160 P. 561], it was said (quoting from Peop,le v. 
67 Cal. [7 P. 643]): "'While against 
deceased are admissible in evidence to show malice, threats 
another person are only admitted under cireum-
sta,nc,es wkiek skow' some connection witk tke injury inflicted 
the deceased.' (The are Where a sufficient 
connection is shown such threats are clearly admissible.'' 
The evidence here showed that both persons had been 
in the same manner and, presumably, at approximately 
same time. The letter to Despine which accused her of 
a sexual degenerate could certainly be considered a 
malicious letter and the one to Robert a threat because of his 
to Despine. (People v. Hong Ak Duek, 61 Cal. 
390; People v. (Jlur;ves, 122 Cal 134, 143 [54 P. 596]; 
v. De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 474 [50 P.2d 1031].) 
The court did not err in admitting secondary evi-
dence of the contents of the letters inasmuch as proof of the 
destruction thereof was made by Inspector Wood who 
testified as to the contents of the letters. Section 1855 
Code of Civil Procedure provides that ''There can be 
evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing 
except in the following cases: 
'' 1. When the original has been lost or destroyed; in 
which ease proof of the loss or destruction must first be 
. . . '' The same section also provides that when a 
has been lost or destroyed, either a copy thereof or 
as to the contents may be admitted. (People v. 
<r'"'"''m 110 Cal.App.2d 456, 462, 463 [243 P.2d 59]; Deaoon, 
Bryans, 88 Cal.App. 322,324 [263 P. 371],) 
7G CaL fl74 i lH P. 
eontended that the trial eourt erred in 
in evidence of (,ertain 'fhe poliee offieer who 
to Arkansas after defendant while certain 
his first eonversation with defendant. ·when 
he made a copy thereof 
of machine. At the defense counsel 
to the use of the copy wl1ich was played be-
cause its sound facilities were better. In addition, the orig-
inal also 
Evidence vvas admitted to show the eopy was a true and 
correct one and defendant was advised by the trial court 
prior to the playing of the copy of the recording that it 
,,·as secondary evidence. [12] Both the original recording 
ani!. the eopy thereof were admitted in evidence without 
objection, and the original, as well as the copy, was played 
to the jury. Under the circumstances here present, defendant 
eannot now complain that a copy of the original recording 
was played to the jury. (People v. Porter, 105 Cal.App.2d 
324, 331 f233 P.2cl 102]; People v. Wignall, 12G Cal.App. 
465, 474 !13 P.2d 995]; People v. Sellas, 114 Cal.App. 367, 
378 [300 P. 150] .) 
[13] Defendant also complains that certain notes and a 
\Vl'itten transcription of the tape reconling used by the 
officer were erroneously admitted in evidence over objec-
tion. 'l'he reeord shows that the notes were used pursnant to 
section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procednre. * 'I' he record 
shows that the questioned writings were marked for identifica-
tion; that the court informed all attorneys they might see and 
nse them, to whieh defense counsel replied, '' 'l'hank yon 
Ycry much.'' 
'A witness is allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by 
:mything written by himself, or under his direc-tion, at the time when the 
f:tct occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at nny other time when 
the fact was fresh in his memory, and he knew that the same was cor-
rectly stated in the writing. But in such case the writing must be 
produced, and may be seen by the adverse party, who may, if he choose, 
cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it to the jury. So, also, 
a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollec-






rl'~'illlr•d I h;il 
h<'Pll in nf ('f'I'IUrJ!f•S 
m lw was not ~(·~~~~ pnrkc"l 011 
r·om·l lws said tlmt lli onle1· fo r~on'itllulc ng 111 
\\'ai•·hing· and rorH'PalmeJ;t 111\lSl 
" 811 tic. 4] Cn1.2d El2 P .2d 
Byrd. 42 Ca1.2cl 200. 20!1 P 2d :lOG i: 
\' TnthW. :n Cal.2d ~~2. 101 [lin P.2rl lfij) \Ye 
hen• the eknwnis of an;l wa1ehi11g, but the 
is dcYoill of any cddcnee trnr1ing 1o show that il1e 
dP!'<·JHlant mn(le :111,\' to ro11rcal himself or to 
JH'Psence in the •deinily of the slwp a srrrct. Jn tfl~" 
ease. it waR held !hat "1·on,·ealnwnt in mnbush" W<IS 11oi 
1',\' 111111 thnt i he C!Yiclenee tlwrc fnlly fied the s 
fi1Hling "tltat the homiciile wns tlw result of drfendant's in-
l•" to kill anc1 was ~H:romplished h)' his ' in \Ynit' nniil 
npportnne time to strike. . '' Cal.2d 48:i, 492. 493. 
'· j ,; Tuthill ra::;P, it 11·a~ held 1ha1' tll(• we~~ 
"'mrans' iln·ougl1 which defrudmJt his 
I'. HISC." (31 Cal.2d D2, ]01.) Tn il1e r!l enrw. tlH~ i'VI· 
~'<' slwwe1l tlwt rlrJencla11t ·waited outside his ,,·ife 's lHmsr• 
Yrith n g·un nnr1 ihat thr mui'rler oernrred that nig·ht 
C'a1.2,1 200. 2mn. fn illrs(~ tbrer~ Nt;;e~ tlw killing·s or-
after ilii~ '' in wnit." and l.1in:.r in •.Yait 
tll<' "i'l<'illl~" tl!roll.':·li w!Ji,]J <·:wli d<'f<·nd:!lli :l<'•'<>lllJili:-;h(•rl 
l'"'llll'id<·. I 11 t I~<· pr<'c<'lil ,.;,·:•·. IIi•· !;illi ,,,.,.lllT•·d ~>II 
ll<l>l'lllil ,,r· 11,,. "Oil,: !lw I:J;.;I linl<' .J,.r id:Jill lu"l ]J,.,.,J 
, .. 11 pi! rl;<•d i 11 l1 i.-; ,.;~ r i 11 I !1<· 1 i<"illil 11 :1>1 "'' ilH· I :-1111: ll<· 
1• 111>1 "''''" \\illl'hing or \\'nil Dll Ill;· lll<>l'iling· of tJ,,. 
<11. nll.hongh lJ,. wm; ;or'<'ll dri\'lll!!' his vnr in tluil. 1'i11ini! 
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at that time. The facts in the case under consideration do 
not appear to us to a in wait instruction. The 
killings were not accomplished through defendant's watchful 
waiting in his car; there was no attempt at either concealment 
or secrecy ; and the killings did not follow on the heels of the 
watchful 
not sufficient to 
can be no doubt 
ili~ ~~ 
if the killing was committed by lying in it was murder 
of the first by force of the statute Code, § 189) 
and the question of premeditation was not further involved 
(People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 200, 209 [266 P.2d 505]; People 
v. Tutlvill, 31 Cal.2d 92, 99 [187 P.2d 16]). 
Two REASONABLE THEORIES INSTRUCTION 
[15] It is next contended that the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury concerning its duty if the evi-
dence was susceptible of two reasonable theories. 
Defendant offered this instruction: ''If the evidence in 
this case is susceptible of two constructions or interpreta-
tions, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one 
of which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other 
to his innocence, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt that 
interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence, 
and reject that which points to his guilt. 
"You will notice that this rule applies only when both 
of the two possible opposing conclusions appear to you to be 
reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible con-
clusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other 
to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the 
reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing 
in mind, however, that even if the reasonable deduction points 
to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must carry the con-
vincing force required by law to support a verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
The court instructed the jury as follows: ''A defendant 
in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the 
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an ac-
quittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place 
upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It 
is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to 
of lwo eonsiri!l'i ions or 
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which appears to you to be 
to the guilt of the defendant, and the other 
uu<vc.c;ucoc, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt that 
which will admit of the defendant's innocence, 
that which to his guilt.' This 
proper as far as it goes. To it shmtlcl have been 
statement the 1tneler dis-
added.) It will be notN1 that in tlw 
f·ase the "precise principle" 1vas 
tu instrnction which was given in tlw 
Bender was here omitted. In the Bender case, we held 
that under the facts there presented, the failure to instrnet 
was not ground for reversal. 
The evidence here is entirely circumstantial. No mnrdcr 
\n·apon 1n~apons) were ever found; no fingerprints matc11-
those of defendant were found in the ceramics shop. 
The most incriminating evidence against defendant is that he 
was identified as the man coming out of the back gate of the 
ceramics shop. Defendant's theory was that he was not 
g·uilty; tha.t he was not in Los Angeles on the 20th, although 
h admitted having bren there on the Bd through the 8th 
or 9th of September when he left for Texas. From the 
resumi\ of the evidence heretofore set forth, it appears that 
at the time the case was submitted to the jury reasonable 
inferences of either guilt or innocence could have been drawn 
therefrom. The jury could have disbelieved the idcntifiea-
tion testimony of Mr. Yonadi who said it was the defendant 
he Raw coming out of the back gate; it could have disbelieved 
the testimony of Mrs. Simons who said that the defendant 
1vas the man she bad seen in the areaway because she recog-
nized "the lower part of his face" from a colored picture. 
l'n<lcr the eircnmstances here presented, that part of Clu-
fcndant 's instruction bearing upon two reasonable intcrpreta-
1 ions. or constructions, of the evidence should have been given. 
Defendant's offered instruction was refused bceanse the 
trial court felt that it was not good law in that it "virtually 
says that 1vhen ilw PYideJH'0 is eqnall.\· hahmec•11 tlw defend-
ant is eni i !led to a Yerdid of ac(]uitta1" and because it 
~was in t·onflid. wiilt t1t<' t·easomthlP <lonht inst rn..tion. [16] In 
;l •·rilllinul ('ase llw pl·use<·Jtl ion HlWd pro\'<' i lit• ,],.f,•tHla!l1 
lty a r<'f!Sonable <lo1tbi. 'l'h<·t·<'fOl'<\ if flt(' t•Yill<'tH·P 
ts <·q hahtll<'<'d. the d('f<·n<lani iN Ptliitlt•tl to an a('<ptittal. 
Pnrillt•J>, tlwn· is in thn propos<'d instrnetion nothing int'Oil-
sisteut \Yith the instnwtion on reasonable doubt. The offered 
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,J., and \'0111'11 
disse11t. 
y opinion bases 1he reverRal npon I 
the trial court eommittcd prejwlidal 
respects: ( In to try the 
of dcfendani 's sanity at the commencement of the trial 
defendant to withdraw his of not 
reason of insanity following the trial on the of 
( 3) In an instmction on the subject of 
in ; and In failing to give a certain """'"n,o<~t 
s1 ruetion relating to circumstantial evidence. In my 
a review of the record, including the evidence, shows that 
def'<'!Htant was accorded a fair trial, free from any prejudicial 
; that defendant was properly convicted of a deliberai <~ 
premeditated murder perpetrated by means of lying in 
and that no ground for reversal has been shown ao:; 
thrre has been no "miscarriage of justice." ( Const., art. 
§ 4J;2.) 
may be conceded at the outset that defenrlan t was an 
mmsnal type of person, whose history and actiom; may bP 
Sii to ha\·e evidenced some deYiation from the normal. 'fhp 
may he said, however, cotH:('rning a large perceutage 
of JH'f'sons vvl10 commit sPrions crimes; but this does not in-
(liente that snch persons have not the reqn isite eapacit,v i o 
to trial and conviction for the offenses \vhich 
It is only certain types of iucapaeitics, within the 
broad meaning of the word "insane," which deprive a per-
son of snfficient capaeity to stand trial upon criminal eharges 
v. Pen·y, 14 Cal.2d 387, 399 [94 P.2d f5G9, 124 A.hR 
; People v. Kirby, 15 Cal.App. 264, 2G8 fll4 P. 7941) 
or which deprive him of sufficient eapaeit,v to be held (~rim-
responsiblc for his acts. (People v. J(imball. ;) Cal.2d 
GOF'. GlO [55 P.2d 483] .) It is for this reaROJl that mere 
evidenee that a person is "insanc" or of "unsound 
" which often means no more than that there is sonH' 
dPYiation from the normal in some respect, has been held in 
eases to be insufficient to show lack of capaeity of the 
individual for a particular purpose. (Estate of Lingen-
said at page 568 [241 P.2d :"Even 
as to insanity in a general sense 
to create a doubt insofar as that testimony 
to the defendant's ability to conduct his 
Darling, 107 Cal.App.2d 635 [237 
v. Huntoon, 41 Cal.App. 392 [182 
case, a reading of the record, including 
and his other statements made during 
trial, leaves no doubt that defendant ap-
and rational person, although 
v""'""~'eu of the best judgment. In addition, the 
considerrrl of the three court-appointrrl experts who 
examined him the course of the trial showed that 
defendant was sane both at the time he committed the offense 
and at the time of trial. Defendant obviously was keenly 
aware of the nature of the charge and of the proceedings, 
and had definite ideas concerning the manner in which 
he wanted the case tried. It appears that from the outset he 
of entering a plea of not guilty by 
He was represented by able counsel, who 
no doubt realized that the evidence would clearly indicate 
that defendant had killed the victims, and that it might be 
advisable under the circumstances to interpose the additional 
of not by reason of insanity. In this connection, 
counsel obtained the affidavit of Dr. Thfiller and presented 
it to the but without any suggestion that anyone was 
of the that defendant then lacked the capacity to 
stand trial upon the charge against him. On the contrary, 
the affidavit was presented by counsel solely ''regarding the 
plea of not by reason of insanity." The court there-
upon accepted that plea and appointed, as was its duty, three 
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that defendant was sane at all 
i imes. All of these facts clearly indicated that defendant 
would be found sane upon any trial of the issue. Counsel 
therefore stated: ''I was going to make this statement, 
the Court please, that the defense is prepared to go ahead 
with this of not guilty by reason of insanity. I under~ 
Mr. ~Ierkouris feels differently about it." 
followed an extended discussion between court and de-
\Vhich included defendant's repeated insistence that 
did not want a trial on the insanity issue and 
with the court's statement: "I1et the record show the 
of not guilty reason of insanity has been withdrawn." 
Coum;cl did not enter into this discussion or advance any 
thereto or to the final declaration of the court con-
withdrawal of the plea. The record therefore in-
<licates final acquiescence by counsel in, rather than any 
"implied objection" to, defendant's withdrawal of the plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity. The situation is quite 
similar to that presented in People v. Perry, sttpra, 14 Cal. 
2d 387, where "defendant, in person," withdrew the plea 
his eonnsel had prPviously stated, "I am willing 
ro proceed with this insanity plea." (P. 396.) I am there-
fore of the opinion that there was neither error nor an abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court in permitting the 
withdrawal of the plea, and manifestly there was no prej-
udice. 
\Vith to the instructions, the majority opinion 
concludes tl1at the trial court committed prejudicial error 
in g1vmg any instruction on the subject of lying in wait, 
as "the evidence is not sufficient to justify the lying in wait 
instruction." I cannot join in this conclusion, as I do not 
bclieye it can br reconciled with the decisions of this court in 
People v. Byrd. 42 Cal.2d 200 [266 P.2cl 5051 ; People v. 
41 Cal.2d 483 [261 P.2d 241]; and People v. 'fniMll, 
::n Cal.2d 92 [187 P.2d 16]. 
Prom the evidence set forth in the majority opinion, tJ1e 
jury could properly infer that defendant had long enter-
tained the deliberate and premeditated intention of killing 
his victims; that he had obtained guns for that particnlar 
purpose; ! hat he ha<l i raveled from Detroit to TJos A ngde!l 
in a Pontiac antomobile and registered under an assumed 
name to conceal his identity; that he had waited in, and 
watched from, his automobile in the vicinity of his victims' 
place of business for long hours during many pre-
his intended 
and no other person was in their 
accomplished his purpose 
by means of such lying in wait. 
opinion states: "We have here the elements 
and watching, but the record is of any 
""uuu.,~ to show that the made any 
"'"'"'"''u himself or to his presence in the 
a secret. '' In roy opinion, there was 
to show that all the necessary elements of in wait 
The "concealment" which is mentioned in con-
with lying in wait has never been held to mean com-
concealment from everyone. Such complete conceal-
is ordinarily impossible. All that is required, or should 
be is evidence showing an attempt on the part of 
the murderer to conceal his presence from his intended vic-
while watching and waiting for the opportune time to 
out his purpose. Thus, evidence of watching and wait-
in an automobile on a public street or road for the nn"f>n.r.'"' 
perpetrating murder has been held sufficient to 
the of an instruction on lying in wait (People v. Byt·d, 
Cal.2d 200; People v. Butic, 41 Cal.2d 483 [261 
) , and it is immaterial in any case that the intended 
victim may have become actually aware of the presence of 
murderer either immediately before or some time before 
the killing occurred. (People v. Butic, sttpra; People v. 
supra, 31 Cal.2d 92.) It appears sufficient if the 
"'"''""'"~and waiting are accompanied by any attempted con-
cealment from the victim as "part of defendant's plan to take 
victim later by surprise.'' (People v. Butic, sup1·a, 41 Cal. 
2d 492.) 
court has not heretofore adopted the view ""''"'""''"'""'rl 
dissenting opinion in People v. Byrd, supra, 42 
217-218, that despite the existence of ample evidence 
to show watching, waiting and attempted concealment from 
intended victim until the opportune time to n,·,.nt>tv·<>t<> 
the an instruction on lying in wait is 
it appears that the victim became "aware of defendant's 
' prior to the murder and "there is no evidence that 
the shots were fired from a position of concealment." 
I do not believe that such view should be 
an in-
the 
however : ''In the present 
the morning of the 20th; the 
seen in his car in the 
on the 18th; he was not seen watching or waiting 
HW'L"''us of the 20th, although he was seen driving his 
car in at that time. The facts in the case 
consideration do not appear to us to justify a lying 
in wait instruction.'' I cannot follow this reasoning. There 
was evidence that defendant had been watching and waiting 
in his car near the scene of the murder on the morn-
and afternoons of at least eleven separate days in Sep-
tember to September 20, the last day being September 
There was also evidence that defendant was driving his 
car and later walking in the vicinity on the morning of the 
murder on 20. The jury could properly infer 
that all such including the day of the murder, de-
fendant was attempting to conceal himself from his intended 
victims in order to take them by surprise, and was watching 
and for the opportune moment to perpetrate the 
murder. I find no authority to indicate that one who watches 
and waits for the opportune moment to commit murder while 
in an automobile or on foot in the vicinity of a par-
may not be held to be ''lying in wait'' within 
of section 189 of the Penal Code, and no good 
reason appears for so I am therefore of the opinion 
that there was abundant evidence to justify the giving of 
the instruction on lying in wait; and that the conclusion of 
the that the evidence was insufficient for that pur-
ities. 
finds no support in the authorities cited in 
but is directly contrary to said author-
The reversal by the majority is further predicated upon 
circumstantial 
trial court did in the instructions 




rd1earing was denied June 20, 
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